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dc.creatorGustale Cardoni, Juan Manuel
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-04T20:20:07Z
dc.date.available2021-01-04T20:20:07Z
dc.date.created2012-01-01
dc.date.issued2012-01-01
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dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorio.bcp.gov.py/handle/123456789/150
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that the role of central banks within financial markets should be increased. If central banks are to be responsible for financial stability, they should retain some supervisory capacity. There are synergies between the supervisory function and its capacity to act as lender of last resort. Payment and settlement systems are also essential to reduce systemic risk. This paper also addresses mitigation of systemic risk, which was not appropriately managed during the crisis. An integrated supervisory approach is appropriate to deal with financial conglomerates and the parallel banking system. In order to improve the mechanisms and adequately diminish the likelihood of systemic risk, central banks need useful tools, including the power to regulate and supervise financial markets. Overall, the best approach for a developing country with a small financial sector is to adopt a single entity structure, preferably with the central bank in charge.
dc.format.extent61 páginas
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherBCP
dc.relation.ispartofArtículos y Análisis de Discusión
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
dc.subjectBANCA CENTRAL
dc.titleConsolidating supervisory architecture and mitigating systemic risk.The role of Central Banks
dc.title.alternativeConsolidar la arquitectura supervisora ​​y mitigar el riesgo sistémico. El papel de los bancos centrales
dc.typearticle
dc.subject.keywordCENTRAL BANK
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.type.spaArtículo
dc.type.hasversionPublished Version
dc.rights.ccCC0 1.0 Universal
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto


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